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The problem is to recognize which 
interest groups are exerting prepon-
derant influence and for what 
purposes ••• our theme, therefore, is 
the need to subject the gothic 
mysteries of science and technology 
to ordinary political analysis, 
commonsense political judgment, 
and plain English. 
--H. s. Nieburg, In The Name of Science 
Chapter I 
Introduction a 
The Political Science of Science 
I. Flan of Work. Role of the Introduction. 
The bulk of this paper is devoted to a lengthy 
explication, analysis, and harshly negative critique of the 
course of the notorious debate, not yet closed, on the role 
of falsification in the growth of scientific knowledge. 
While it is primarily addressed to those conversant with 
recent research in the area, the paper is written with a 
view toward intelligibility and lucidity. and is as self 
contained as possible. It could therefore plausibly be 
read as a separate document. 
My aim in this introduction is to construct the 
framework -- and to do no more than that -- for the anal-
ysis of the historical success of .the scientific enterprisG 
from the vantage point of political theory. That is, I 
propose to describe briefly, and by describing, expose, the 
unholy alliance struck between the dominant (and, inciden-
tally, Liberal1 ) theory of the nature of science and the 
received (Liberal) view of the nature of the proper rela-
tion between science and government. 
I wish to suggest that these theories exist in a 
symbiotic relationship, that the epistemology is cognate 
with the politics, and vice versa, and that the falsifica-
tion of the first compells the abandonment of the second. 
It would be giving away my conclusion, were I to remark 
that of course the main part of the paper is intended as 
an effort in this direction. 
II. Th~ Latent Politics of Contempor~ry Philosophy of 
Science. 
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The standard theory of science, in the diverse forms 
conferred upon it by Popper and by ~. is systematically 
described in the paper, and its ideological functions are 
dealt with there. I don't want to antic.i:pate that section, 
and so will confine myself here to a few global remarks. 
Generally one can say that the two forms of the 
theory, however sensationally they may differ in other con-
texts, share the autonomy thesis, a view according to which 
the only legitimate criterion for the ·eTaluation of a sci-
entific conclusion is an internal one, that is, one emerging 
from the scientific process itself, This thesis has been 
formulated by Popper as follows1 
••• there are pure scientific values and dis-
values (Unwerte) and extta-sc.ientific values 
and disvalues. And although it is impossible 
to wholly preserve scientific research from 
extra-scientific values and applications, 
still it is the task of scientific criticism 
and discussion to oppose the mixing of the 
two spheres, and especially to rigorously 
exclude extra-scientific values from influ-
encing the discussion of th~ truth of an 
assertion (Wahrheitsfragen) . 
and is presupposed in an extreme form in Kuhn's confident 
gloss that 
My argument ••• goes even further, for it 
emphasizes that, unlike most disciplines, 
the responsibility for applying shared 
scientific values, must be left to the 
specialists group. It may not even be 
extended to all scientists, much less to 
all educated laymen, much less the mob.J 
(Taking this statement of Kuhn's at its face value, phil-
osophy of science, conceived as a specialists' scientific 
group, must be immune to any political criticism not accep-
. 
ted by the group itself. Assuming normal professional 
narrow-mindedness and disciplinary xenophobia, none will be 
made, and in due course the absence of any criticism will 
be cited as additional support for the now evident truth of 
the autonomy thesis.) 
In both cases the autonomy postulate is targeted to 
deny the theoretical (as opposed to the merely accidental, 
or "historical") significance for science of extra-
scientific "ideologies" (such as Marxism, Pragmatism, or 
for that matter, natural theology), economic change, or the 
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influence of politics generally. Moreover, in neither ver-
sion is the theory at all interested in the unique individual 
actually doing science, although Kuhn exhibits an interest 
in groups. In this way both Popper and Kuhn can preserve 
the traditional, Liberal, insistence on the unitary charac-
ter of science as a method{ology), and maintain a strict 
separation of scientific fact from practical {in the sense 
of the German '"praktisch"), although obviously, in Kuhn's 
case, not from professional, values. 
There are, however, real differences between Popper 
and Kuhn, which it would be exceedingly unwise to neglect. 
Popper, as will be seen shortly, employs a ·very old image 
of science, which is rather grossly incognate with the 
present i..~dustrial reality. Kuhn, who ha: taken the phe-
nomenon of "puzzles" -- small problems the form of whose 
solutions are specified in advance -- Iar :more seriously 
than anyone else, stands poised on the brink of the abyss 
which separates Liberal epistemology from a vastly more 
radical {and in present context, subversive) account of the 
nature of knowledge. Indeed his {alleged) subsequent re-
trenching from the position he outlined in the first, 1962 
edition of his Structure of Scientific Bevrolutions may be 
viewed as the consequence of his realization of just where 
his theories were taking him. 4 
But what of Liberal political theory? What is the 
liberal view of the relation between sc:Jence and government? 
r s 
It is this topic to which I propose to devote the rest of 
this introduction, in the conviction that the political 
prescriptions of liberalism can best be elucidated in the 
light of their unarticulated epistemological presuppo-
sitions, and that the discussion of epistemology -- of 
philosophy of science, on the Liberal account -- can be 
advanced by a consideration of the topic's hidden political 
dimension. 
III. The Latent Philosophy of Science of Contemporary 
Politics. 
Price5 and Galbraith6 start from the present posi-
tion of science taken to include both the natural and 
social sciences in American life. Their joint concern 
is to develop an account "not only of the practical relation 
of scientific institutions to the economy and the government," 
but also of the theoretical relation of science to political 
values ..... 7, they are, in other words, political theorists 
concerned with the relationship of science to the govern-
ment. 
Now there are some minor differences of emphasis and 
vocabulary between Price and Galbraith. Price concerns him-
self exclusively with the "scientific estate," while Gal-
braith elongates his unit to include other components of 
the knowledge industry, in particular, :members of univer-
sity faculties not belonging in thp sciences. Moreover, 
Price's work on close examination discloses evidence of its 
6 
belated emergence from the anti-Communist chrysalis from 
which so much recent American political "thought" has 
emerged, and he exhibits throughout a far more naive and 
simple-minded perception of politics in an advanced indus-
trial society than does Galbraith. However, Galbraith him-
self has conceded that 
I have appropriated and somewhat altered the 
usage of my friend Professor Don K. Price ••• 8 and r·am much indebted to his valuable book ••• 
and the similarities in assumptions, conclusions, and argu-
ment are so strong that I think one is justified in treating 
them as representatives of a single viewpoint, which is 
.Liberal. 
Their argument may be paraphrased as followsa 
Power in advanced industrial society depends 
on control of the means of production, and 
science is increasingly the most significant 
component of the production process. Conse-
quently, it is to the producers of scientific 
knowledge that political power now accrues. 
This means that the mantle of the classical, 
profit-maximizing capitalist has now fallen on 
the shoulders of the members of the educational 
and scientific estate, who are ensconced chiefly 
in universities and research institutes. These 
latter, being devoted to science, do not share. 
the ruthlessness and prejudices of the antagon-'· 
ists with whom they must still contend for 
political power, the personnel of the 500 
largest corporations. This educational and 
ecientific estate, fired with the ~ of 
truth, and its free pursuit, have it within 
7 
their compass to buffer the acid results of politics, insuring 
the hegemony of truth, good taste, and welfare 
capitalism. 
Even a cursory examination will show that the view 
of science implied in this account includes the autonomy 
thesis as an essential element. This is not surprising, for 
earlier the autonomy principle had been extensively identi-
fied with Liberalism. Consider, in cameo, the following. 
First, as Price incautiously lets slip,9 the argu-
ment presupposes a {simple-minded!) dichotomy of truth vs. 
power. Government is conceived as a realln of action and 
will, which may or may not bear any access to truth, either 
of morality or of science. The scientilic realm, on the 
other hand, is imagined to be sealed off by a Chinese Wall 
of integrity from contamination by politics. Where poli-
tics is admitted to have stolen its way into the scientific 
sector, its intrusion is always viewed as pathological. On 
this account Lysenko is the perverse epon~ for a whole 
universe of malificent possibilities. 
So it comes to be imagine4 that research priorities, 
problem selection, problem solving strategies, and most of 
all the transactions at conferences or in journals of the 
"invisible college" of active research workers somehow 
8 
escape'the effects of the societal medium in which they are 
enveloped -- a medium characterized above all by scarcity, 
compulsive competition, and the omnipresence of politics. 
Secondly, the character of scientific fact is un-
reflectively held to be uniquely free of public value • 
. 
Price, for instance, remarks that 
•••• scientific precision is purchased by an 
abstraction, and an exclusion of concern for 
purpose and value, that make it impossible to 
deal simultaneously with all the aspects of 
any concrete problem.10 · 
and Galbraith often criticizes the received opinion of his 
discipline, not for embracing its nominal. canons of neu-
trality, but for its failure to live up ·t~ them. Speaking 
of the mass refusal by academic economists to acknowledge 
the existence of industrial concentration and consequent 
market power, he remarks that 
In denying scientific recognition or even 
legitimacy to this trend, economic theory 
was not being politically and socially 
neutral ••••• It was playing an .active -- an 
actively1fonservative -- role in the political process. 
And elsewhere he comments that 
Economics has not been a science but a 
conservatively useful belief de.fending 
that belief as a science.12 
The manifest assumption here is that a scientific theory of 
the proper credentials would not share these failings, but 
actually be neutral. 
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Finally, and related to the foregoing, neither 
Price nor Galbraith finds very much problematic about the 
entire scientific enterprise, however much individual specu-
lations are excoriated. For them, the status of natural 
(and authentic social) science, in weal or woe, is invar-
iably quo. The suggestion that one might want to examine 
scientific conclusions from the standpoint of one or another 
metaphysic, or suggest that historical counter-examples be 
enlisted to scrutinize the most fashionable contemporary 
theories instead of the other way around (eg., witches or 
religious mystics cited as evidence against some version of 
a reductionist psychology, rather than the employment of 
the psychology to eliminate the historicity of witches) --
all of this to Price and Galbraith, wculd appear prepos-
terous. A fortiori, the suggestion that a social science 
research program should constitute itself around a political 
position. 
Such are the implications of their position, a 
view which over the centuries has acquired a quality of 
obviousness not much inferior to the rotundity of the earth. 
But however persuasive it may appear on the first compla-
cent glance, it cannot be stressed too often or too strongly 
that the entire argument hangs suspended by a single, slender 
thread -- one of a highly theoretical character. For it is 
the autonomy thesis alone that ties together the politics 
and the philosophy of modern science. 
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IV. Consequence of Malfeasance. 
Although Price and Galbraith are read mainly by 
social scientists, an audience which overlaps but slightly 
with that of Popper and Kuhn, their accord with the expli-
cit conclusions of coniemporary philosophy of science has 
·~_:$ 
not been without malignity. The amiable, albeit uncon-
scious agreement contributes to the specious aura of inevi-
tability which the autonomy thesis currently possesses. 
Had either school developed a different viewpoint, some 
word of the disagreement would inevitably have leaked back 
to the other, perhaps providing a stimulus for review and 
self-criticism. Examples of such cross-fertilization are 
rare, but they have happened. Perhaps then the political 
significance of science in the modern wor1d would not have 
been so long occluded, we would have been spared the men-
dacity and self-deception of twenty years of Research and 
Development rhetoric about the "challenge to national great-
ness," "because it is there," or the "pUJ.1 of the unknown," 
etc., and we would sooner have come to suspect that, as is 
argued in the remainder of this paper, in capitalist society, 
truth is power's last and most insidious DJaSk • 
• 
Chapter Ila 
Industrialization and Falsification 
I. The Argument Summarized. Preliminary Remarks. 
The most striking characteristic of academic thought 
is its innocence. What follows is an argument that this 
innocence grossly distorts current discussions of the role 
of falsification in the growth of scientific knowledge• 
Specifically, that the real causes of the irresolution and 
aimlessness of the dispute are the diverse images of the 
societal functions of science, comprising both descriptive 
and prescriptive components, held firmly, although not fully 
consciously, by Popper,13 Kuhn, 14 and Feyerabend. These 
images are of varying agesa each was once functional, but 
only Feyerabend's comports the present situation in the 
political economy of knowledge. This fact is obscured by 
the disputant·s' habit of pulling their examples indiscrim-
inately from Thales down to Niels Bohr and beyond. More-
~ver, once the ideological cataracts are removed, one can 
observe right under the unwitting noses of philosophers of 
science the first, faint signs of the withering away of 
natural science, a phenomenon to which Feyerabend's work 
contributes. 
Throughout the paper I elide the distinction between 
science and technology. This is less £roDll indolence than 
from philosophic conviction, which can here only be stated 
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and not justified. In my opinion, a distinction between the 
two might have made sense in only one historical epoch, viz., 
the one that just ended. 15 That no statesman's rodomontade 
is bereft of a reference, however fleeting, to the sanguin-
ary state of the nation's "science and technology" is the 
tribute moribund usage pays to relentless reality. More-
over, as is currently fashionable, I treat science as con-
. 
terminous with knowledge. This is manifestly inadequate, 
and would be a good subject for a paper -- another one. 
II. Contemporary Science Integrated Into the National 
Political Economy. A Sketch for Background. 
Once the sciences played only an indirect role in 
the maintenance and expansion of the political economy of 
capitalism. The New Science of Physics was the natural 
scion of a New Science of Politics, and the old modes of the 
legitimation of political authority first shuddered, then 
crashed into ruins. The way was open for the bourgeois 
revolutions of the 17th, 18th, and 19th ce.nturies. 16 But 
in the New Industrial State, 17 (or, less e1egantly, the 
hegemony of Monopoly Capita118), science has another, 
·grander role. 
This is its elevation to what Eisner recognizes as 
the "critical factor of production, 111 9 on a par with the 
hoary triad of land, labor, and capital. ~his industrial-
ization of science transforms both scieace20 and indus-
trialism21 out of recognition. The mutations of industrial-
1J 
ism have never lacked for interested commentators, but what 
are the consequences for science? This is Ravetz's ques-
tion, and his answer, even when discounted for its pre-
liminary formulation, is devastating. 
First, the extravagantly honored image of science as 
the disinterested search for truth goes the way of the 
economists' perfect competition under monopoly capital. This 
. 
image will not vanish into thin air it is much too useful 
to some interested parties for that but only philosophers 
of science will be fooled. Science is now a commoditya and 
is another -- merely another -- aspect of commerce. Like 
any other commodity, it is a victim of the craving for 
money, for profits, and for powers the object of pork-barrel 
politics, and skullduggery, that charac"terize "political 
capitalism. 022 
No Karl Marx is needed to predict that such porten-
tious changes in the forces of production will recrder the 
relations of production. And the loss of scientific inde-
pendence is a second aspect of the new political economy of 
knowledge a 
••• This change is as radical as tlnat which 
occurred in the productive economy when inde-
pendent artisan producers were displaced by 
capital-intensive factory production employing 
hired labor ••• With his loss of independence, 
the scientist falls into one of three rolesa 
either an employee, working under the control 
of a superior; or an individual Olltworker for 
investing agencies, existing on a succession 
of small grantsa or he may be a can.tractor, 
managing a unit or an establishmemt which 
produces research on a large scale by contract 
with agencies.23 
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Thirdly, science becomes bureaucratized. This has 
effects on the personnel. Organization men people the 
organization, and Minerva's owl flies from 9 - 5. Far more 
malign, however, is the shift in the seat of quality con-
trol, for notwithstanding an occasional scandal, the National 
. 
Science Foundation does not yet give money awaya 
The dispersal of large sums of money, and even 
more the decisions between competing demands, 
are matters which require proper procedures of 
information and control. A completely informal 
consensus of a large community is not suffi-
ciently precise or reliable to be the basis 
for such work; and the investing ,agencies must 
work from the evaluations and judgements of a 
group of advisors. With this eoacentration 
of powers of decision and contro.J.. the free 
market place of scientific resu.l"t&,, whose 
value is established after they are offered 
and by an informal consensus, is replaced by 
an oligopoly of investing agencies,, whose 
prior decisions determi~e what will eventually 
come on to the market.2~ 
New forms of property spring up. Once "scientific 
property" was a paper in a recognized journal. Now a good 
personal contact to the source of the magic spigot will do, 
or alternatively, a high score of publication points will be 
equally salutary. 
With the clamor for publication ~he literature be-
comes redefined and vulgarized. Journals proliferate, to 
the general satisfaction of the prestigious editor, satis-
• fied author, and affluent publisher. ~hen the informal 
channels dilates 
Through mailing-list distributions, scientists 
will circulate not only reprints, but also 
preprints, duplicated preliminary research 
reports, conference abstracts, and informal 
'newsletters' of people, events, and results. 
These other types of publication are not 
merely supplements to the off icia1 channel 
of communication, making results available 
more quickly than can the printed journals. 
Rather, they are complementary to that 
channels and their function is to provide 
publication of a sort which is not subject 
to the hazards, as well as the delays, of 
the scrutiny of referees. For the same sort 
of function is performed by raw collections 
of conference papers, published in hard 
covers and sold on the market~ but appro-
priately called 'non-books'.2~ 
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It would be a grotesque blunder to catecarize all this com-
motion under "knowledge dissemination" _. some such rubric. 
~his is to miss its point, which is not t.o be read, but to 
have been written. Ravetz calls the pbanomenon "shoddy 
science." 
The path is clear to more refined., and lucrative, 
forms of corruption. One is "entrepreneurial science"a 
It is in this borderland ••• that we find 
some significant pathological phenomena. The 
first occurs when a contractor (individual or 
institutional) develops a really big enter-
prise, which is most likely to be on some 
mission-oriented research in a·:f'iel.d where 
money is plentiful and not too many questions 
are asked. There then develops a research 
business, making its profit by tile production 
of results in the fulfillment of contracts. 
The director of such an establishment is 
then truly an entrepreneur, who juggles with 
a portfolio of contracts, prospective, 
existing, extendable, renewabie or con-
vertible, from various offices in one or 
several agencies. The business is precarious, 
of course, for his only capital is in his 
friendly contacts with those who decide on 
the allocation of funds. In such a research 
factory, conditions are not usually con-
ducive to the slow, painstaking, and self-
critical work which is necessary for the 
production of really good scientific results. 
Hence, much, most, or even all the work can be 
shoddy1 but the entrepreneur does not operate 
in the traditional market of independent 
artisan producers who evaluate work by con-
sensus. So long as he can keep his contacts 
happy, or at least believing that they 
personally have more to lose by exposing 
themselves through the cancellation or non-
renewal of contracts than by allowing the~ 
to continue, his business will flourish.2 
Still another is christened by Ravetz "reckless 
science"a 
••• a particular innovation may be recognized as 
risky from the technical point of view, dubious 
from the commercial point of view, of very 
slight use to anyone at all, even the State, 
and a potentially serious nuisance to the 
public and source of legal and political dif-
ficulties, and yet still receive enormous sums 
from the State ••• In calculating cost and 
benefit it ignores all those costs of a 
projec~ for which it cannot legally be called 
to accounta in particular, the degradation 
of the natural and human environment. Since 
the combined effect of the present and future 
technological developments is likely to be 
catastrophic, this rush onwards can truly be 
considered out of contro1.27 
And of course there is the terrifying realm of 
16 
"dirty science", of nuclear bombs, gassed sheep, "unthink-
able" thoughts, super-efficient napalm compounds, and 
ICBM's. This last type comprises "research projects whose 
intended application lies beyond the pal.e of civilized 
"28 practice and morality. 
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Such is the reality of industrialized science. 
While it may partake of the humorlessness, and share the 
suffocating Weltanschauung characteristic of the central 
Post-Newtonian tradition in philosophy of science, 29 in its 
totality it presents a unique problem of comprehension. 
Throughout, it is conditioned by one massively novel rela-
tions absorption into the circumambient political economy. 
III. These Facts Not Yet Assimilated by Philosophy of 
Science. 
Contemporary philosophy of science plays with these 
facts like a cat with a ball of yarn -- does everything ex-
cept digest them. This I propose to dmaonstrate by pre-
senting stylized sketches -- all that is necessary -- of the 
views on falsification in science held by Popper, Kuhn, and 
Feyerabend. These sketches are crafted with a view toward 
highlighting .the problematic that I am interested in, and 
of course a much more extensive treatment would be necessary 
for a discussion with pretensions to exhaustiveness. This 
qualification holds throughout, and I wil.l not repeat it in 
the paper. Now to the oldest image of science still in 
'circulation, dating from a period of relatively undeveloped 
productive forces and a primitive division of labor, when 
philosophy and natural science were done by the same per-
sons, that of Popper. 
For this paper there is exactly one point that is 
absolutely crucial to understanding his philosophy of science. 
It is that 
••• all criticism consists in attempted refu-
tations.JO 
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For Popper, science -- whether physical or social -- starts 
with problems. Not data, sensations, 1 hard' facts, or any 
species of observation. Theories are advanced, in the form 
of deductive systems, as possible solutions to these prob-
lems. They are then tested by attempts to find a refuting 
instances all planets in the solar system are conjectured 
to possess.orbits tilting no more than seven degrees from 
the plane of the earth's orbits we look, not for the eight 
which do, but for the one that doesn't. Although we are 
naturally pleased should our theory be corroborated, Nature 
is not asked by the scientist to say "yes", only "no". 
Theories with a refuting instance are junked. If the theory 
resists falsification, it may be accepted pro tempore, and 
subjected to .still more tests. It is overwhelmingly impor-
tant to understand that science progresses only by f alsif i-
cations there is no "positive", accumulated evidence which 
counts when the epistemological chips go down. More empha-
tically, science does not produce "probable" theories, nor 
-are facts irrefragably "established". At any moment, the 
most highly regarded theory may be overthrown by a single 
refutation, touching off a "scientific revolution". Such 
is the Popperian Logic of Scientific Discovery, the "scien-
tia negativa" (Agassi). 
This Popperian theory, however, suffers from one ex-
19 
cruciating drawback1 it is incognate with reality. Inspec-
tion of the available scientific laboratories failed to 
turn up significant evidence of any refutations in progress. 
The scientists, after all, were not consulted in advance, 
and perhaps could not be expected to live up to the extrin-
sic norms prescribed for them. There was an empirical 
chink in the ~heory's logical armor, and it was here that 
the opposition aimed their blowsa 
••• I should like to raise before them [the 
Popperians] the spectre of the history of 
spectroscopy between 1870 and 1900. I think 
it fair to describe this period as one of 
mapping, in which the spectra of the 
elements were described with ever increasing 
precision. There is precious little 'refu-
tation' going on here, yet it would be hard 
to deny Angstrom the title of scientist.31 
That there is normal science ••• is the out-
standing, the crashingly obvious fact which 
confronts and hits any philosophers of science 
who set out, in a practical or technological 
manner, to do any actual scientific research • 
••• real science (basic research, applied, 
technological, are all alike here) ••• is 
normally a habit-governed, puzzle-solving 
activity, not a fundem~ntally upheaving or 
falsifying activity ••• J2 
With Kuhn's arrival, the doubts snowballed, and the 
. opposition grew even more strident. He wrote, referring to 
the alleged falsification experiences. fllndeed, I doubt 
that the latter exist ... 33 For him, science consists, not of 
the single-minded pursuit of refutati.ons, but of a succession 
of periods of "normal science," interrupted by revolutions. 
During normal science, research proceeds inside the circum-
20 
vallatory boundaries of a well defined community of investi-
gators~ with a concrete solution to some past problem em-
braced as a "paradigm" for the solution of the remaining 
difficulties. This paradigm-bound activity, what most 
scientists do, most of the time, is "puzzle solving," and 
is not at all directed toward falsification, but instead 
presupposes the truth of the underlying communal view of 
nature. Eventually some~problems resist solution in this 
vein; the anomalies become major embarassments. There is 
much distress in the profession -- even respectable men are 
failing -- and a crisis usually results. At this point a 
solution to the refractory problem(s) is brought forward 
which is not modelled on the· old paradigm. Arguments that 
"cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or 
mathematical proof"34 ensue. In the end the community as a · 
whole comes round to the new solution, the revolution 
triumphs, and a new paradigm reigns, whence another cycle 
begins, like the endless palace revolts of a banana repub-
lie. 
The question inevitably surfaces as to how Popper 
ever mired himself so intractably in this quicksand of hor-
tatory assertion. Here two questions must be distinguished. 
The first is how he got into it. The second is why he 
didn't get out of it. 
The initial error probably had its roots in the 
• 
special characteristics of Viennese culture during and after 
! 
L 
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World War I. There language (or rather, Language) had just 
replaced the recently deceased and plangently elegized deity 
as the authoritative source for last judgments. It has been 
written that "For Karl Kraus the word has personal life. 
Language, passion and thought are one and the same for him. 
Language is the name of the activity of his passionate 
thinking; his passion and thought are identical with their 
. 
articulation,"35 but he was only the first magnitude star of 
a large and glittering galaxy, whose lesser luminaries in-
cluded Hofmannsthal and Wittgenstein himself. Popper kept 
a low profile for the duration of this linguistic Verkldrte 
Nacht, but did not entirely escape its influences.36 Con-
fronted by the diverse claims to scientific status of Marx-
ism, Relativity, and the psychologies of Adler and Freud, 
he hoped to find the guiding thread out of this labyrinth 
supplied by language, even as he realized that language 
only marked out a path made by other agents. Initially 
posing his problem not as a choice between different kinds 
-of activities, or types of commitments, but as the "problem 
of drawing a line (as well as this can be done) between the 
.statements, or systems of statements, of the empirical 
sciences, and all other statements -- whether they are of a 
religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudo-
scientific, "J? Popper proposed his falsification criterion 
as the solution to this "problem of demarcation," as he 
still refers to it.38 
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In this view, statements possessing scientific 
character were those deemed "capable of conflicting with 
possible, or conceivable, observati~ns ... 39 All others, while 
they might well be meaningful, belonged to some other realm, 
and did not pertain to science, save as a source of conjec-
tures. And although Popper strenuously opposed the subse-
quent search by the Wiener Kreis for a criterion of a state-
ment's meaning, and insisted that the question of linguistic 
meaning was of exiguous import, still the first fatal step 
off into the clouds had been taken. For much is meaningful 
-- as Popper knew well -- that is not scientific. A for-
tiori, however, there is much that can be the subject of 
some abstractly possible test which is of no scientific 
interest whatsoevers questions of language have an lncom-
parably vaster scope than those of science. The concrete, 
active character of the political economy of knowledge got 
lost in ~ philosophical dispute ~ demarcation. This re-
luctance to recognize the diverse interests of philosophy 
and actual science colors all of Popper's subsequent oeuvre, 
indeed, as Masterman remarkss 
At the earliest opportunity ••• Popper leaves 
discussion of scientific theories altogether 
to turn to philosophic theories. in order to 
analyze, brilliantly, whether these are not 
also, in a more direct way, refutable. He 
then, bar a hairsbreadth, equates these with 
scientific theories1 and one suspects that 
••• it is these, and not science as it really !1i ~~!c~i~:.U8s had at the back of his mind 
The result was that Popper, the philosopher of 
Kantian filiation, who was interested in the condition of 
all possible experience, but who also averred that "I ••• 
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have no personal interest in matters of commerce, or in 
commercially minded people, 1141 ended up claiming in effect 
to find his theory confirmed in the relentless pursuit by 
entrepreneurial science of the conditions of all possible 
. 
profitable experience. 
Now Popper's theory of science was not conceived in 
a vacuum, and this is the key to its indurate success. For 
Popper, philosophical problems always came in from the cold, 
i.e., originated outside of philosophy. 42 Some were sug-
gested by the natural sciences, art spun off others, and 
the social sciences were considered to provide still more. 
Not the least of these wellsprings of philosophy was pol-
itics, and Popper could scarcely have been less veiled about 
the political implications of his theories. Relishing his 
starring role in the weighty drama whose plot -- the 2000 
year old struggle to entrench the "Open Society" -- he out-
lined in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society 
And Its Enemies, 43 Popper promoted his generalized phil-
osophy of science, of "Critical Rationalism," as the exclu-
sively suitable ethos of that improbably porous community, 
with which current, Western, more-or-J.ess (often, notably, 
less) Liberal states were extensively identified& 
• 
••• my optimism lies entirely in •Y inter-
24 
made the other look good, and together they were mutually 
conducive to the enlistment of unified belief. Popperians 
routinely identified epistemological dissent with incipient 
totalitarianism, 49 and the good Critical Rationalist, like 
Thomas Mann's liberal artist, was a bohemian only in the 
realm of ideas; for revolution in thought, evolution 
"piecemeal" evolution -- in politics.SO One cannot, however, 
lightly abandon positions whose wreckage implies, not merely 
the defeat of a school, but the Decline of the West. Rather, 
what in other circumstance would be regarded as arrant per-
tinacity presents itself as of transcendent obligation. As 
a consequence, the theory had precious little room for man-
euvering, when its fundemental thesis -- that science pro-
gresses by falsification -- ~am~ into qu.ttation. 
Kuhn, for his part, has professed that "Whatever 
scientific progress may be, we must account for it by exam-
ining the nature of the scientific group, discovering what 
it values, what it tolerates, and what it disdains ... 51 But 
he is no more willing than Popper to admit that among the 
constitutive community values might be those of power and 
moneys that for instance, American physicists have for years 
forsworn theoretical research in favor of more remunerative 
experimental investigations, even though the theoretical 
results, when there are any, possess demonstrably greater 
value.52 His critique updates the image of what scientists 
actually do, to accord more with the .institutional reality, 
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but never leaves the established realm of liberal legitimacy. 
In a word, his image is of a later vintage than Popper's, 
but still elides the brutal realities of the political 
economy of knowledge. This is why he is shocked, like 
Cardinal Bellarmine confronted by Galileo, at the debili-
tating thrust of Feyerabend's criticisma 
••• to describe the argument of Feyerabend's 
as a defense of irrationality in science 
seems to me not only absurd, but vaguely 
obscene.SJ 
And why he must try, in a classic statement of one-dimen-
sional rationality, to render reason virtually coextensive 
with reflection on sciencea 
To suppose ••• that we possess criteria of 
rationality which are independen't of our 
understanding of the essentie..ls of the 
scientific process ks to open the door to 
cloud-cuckoo land.5 
So there Kuhn stands, dismally, able to do no other. 
IV. Feyerabend Abandons The Puzzles. 
But Reason is cunning. It was a quondam Popperian 
who brought to consciousness the suppressed interest in eman-
cipation latent in Popper's philosophy of science. It was 
Feyerabend who, in the Republic of Science, assumed the role 
of Lenin to Popper's Kerensky. 
Feyerabend had earlier showed in a classic series of 
papers, directed mainly at Nagel, that the presence of competing 
theories was a precondition for f8.l.sification, and conse-
quently for progress in science. He thus redirected the 
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interest in research away from the Popperian stress on the 
use of logic as the "Organon of Criticism, .. 55 and back to 
the actual development of science. He developed a view of 
perception which, while it had unmistakable Popperian ante-
cedents, was novel in the stress placed on the ineliminable 
ideational elements of all observations; that they were 
always "theory-laden." Extending this insight through a 
highly origin~l analysis of the case of Gagileo,56 he 
showed that what counts as "observational" has an "histor-
ical characters" that it depends quite often on old and 
senile theories, scarcely consciously held at all (assump-
tions about the medium in which observations are made, ex-
pectations of what is to be observed, etc.). Moreover, one 
can criticize these theories only on the basis of other 
observations, themselves equally theoretical. A correct 
general theory may thus be rejected, not because it is it-
self deficent, but solely because the wrong "observational" 
theories are providing the evidence which is used against 
.its that in other words, "observational" theories can develop 
~ of phase with more general ones. 
In such a situation, where the-"evidence" is over-
whelmingly against a new theory, the recreant are likely to 
despair and kick away their revolution. The alternative, 
Feyerabend argued, is to admit any and all theories, and 
let their proponents concoct the "observational" facts their 
theorles need to acquire plausibility. Normal science flies 
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in the face of such a reversal of the customary relation of 
theory and practice, and so draws Feyerabend's ire. 
First he points to the monolithic character of nor-
mal science, its disquieting likeness to an intellectual 
Brave New Worlds 
The recipe, according to these people, is to 
restrict criticism, to reduce the number of 
theories to one ••• Students must be prevented 
from speculating along different lines and more 
restless colleagues must be made to conform 
and 'to do serious work'. Is this what Kuhn 
wants to achieve?57 
Then he shows that puzzle-solving as a criterion for nor-
mal science's existence comports organized crime, or even 
Oxford philosophy, just as well. This is-because, he 
charges, Kuhn "has failed to discuss the aim of science ... 58 
Now the aim of normal science, even for Kuhn, is to 
create the conditions for scientific revolution. But Feyer-
abend considers Kuhn to err in prescribing a puzzle-solving 
effort, "the ·most boring and most pedestrian part of the 
scientific enterprise, .. 59 as the optimal strategy. Instead 
proliferation of theories must precede a revolution. And 
such progress as there is in science is due to the trans-
formations in the quotidian, "less humanitarian1160 normal 
science 'component', forced by prior theoretical prolifer-
ation in the often invisible, but omnipresent 'philosophical 
component.' 
With the cat this far out of the bag, Feyerabend 
plunges forward, .£2!1 brio. Most scientists, he asserts, 
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resist changes in the philosophical components they are often 
not even aware there is one. 61 Contemporary scientific 
education 
has the purpose of carrying out a rationalistic 
simplification of the process·•science' by 
simplifying its participants. One proceeds as 
follows. First, a domain of research is 
defined. Next, the domain is separated from 
the remainder of history (physics, for example, 
is separated from metaphysics and from theology) 
and receives a 'logic' of its own. A thorough 
training in such a logic then conditions those 
working in the domain so that they may not un-
wittingly disturb the purity (reada the steril-
ity) that has already been achieved. An essential 
part of the training is the inhibitions of in-
tuitions that might lead to a blurring of boun-
daries. A person's religion, for example, or 
his metaphysics, or his sense of humor must not 
have the slightest connection with his scientific 
activity. His imagination is restrained and 
even his language will cease to be his own.62 
So why would any~ne want to be "truly scientific (dreaded 
words!)"63 at all? Why indeed? Unless the answer is "brain-
washing"64 or the machinations of "Stalinists, in politics 
as well as in the philosophy of science.•65 interested in 
preserving "their basic myth. 1166 
Feyerabend sees but one hope for amelioration& we 
must abandon the "normal" practice of science for prolifer-
ation -- ''revival of astrology, wi thcraft, magic, alchemy, 
elaboration of Leibniz's Monadology, and so on, 1167 always 
remembering that the "sciences, after al.1, are our own 
creation, including all the severe standards they seem to 
impose on us, 1168 and that "the choice.:!:!!,~ basic cosmology 
69 • may become.! matter of taste." 
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Kuhn bristles at this suggestion that normal science 
be abandoned. He objects that depriving science of its nor-
mal science puzzles will destroy the progressive character 
of sciences 
By their nature revolutions cannot be the 
whole of sciences something different must 
necessarily go on in between.70 
In the developed sciences, unlike philosophy, 
it is.technical puzzles that provide the usual 
occasion and1often the concrete materials for revolution.'l 
Only after it [the transition to normal science] 
occurs does progress7~ecome an obvious charac-teristic of a field. 
Feyerabend answers by reeling off an example of pro-
gress without puzzlesa 
This objection is refuted by the Presocratics 
who progressed (their theories did not just 
change, they were also improved) without 
paying the slightest attention to puzzles. 
Of course, they did not produce the patterns 
normal science -- revolution -- normal science 
revolution, etc., in which professional stupidity 
is periodically replaced by philosophical out- 73 bursts only to return again at a 'higher level'. 
There is, however, something most curious about this 
proposed model. In no way is it analogous to industrial 
science, and it does not appear at all compatible with any 
of the enterprises sketched in section two of this paper. 
Those conversant with the theories of Marx or the story of 
Midas, will have no difficulties imagining why; for the rest, 
even a nominal perspicacity should suffice for the detection 
of the heavy, if invisible, hand of the political economy of 
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knowledge at work. For puzzle-solving is supported, problem-
solving is not. I. B. M. now smugly advertises that it has 
philosophers on its payroll, but the effectiveness of the 
pitch depends on its shock value. There can be knowledge, 
scholarship, academic rank and tenure, perhaps even progress 
of a sort in efforts such as that of the Pre-Socratics, but 
nothing at all resembling contemporary science. Why doesn't 
. 
Feyerabend see this? 
Here an unsettling question insinuates itself. Per-
haps Feyerabend does grasp the facts of this integration. 
Possible, he doesn't care. Slowly the question begins to 
come into focusa Are Kuhn and Feyerabend interested in the 
same sorts of things? 
I am certain that the answer is no, that Feyerabend's 
explicit raising of the normative issue portends something 
far more drastic than another theory of the nature of science. 
The easiest way to demonstrate this is to inquire into what 
Kuhn is interested in. The answer isa modern science. Now, 
what is modern science interested in? The answer to this 
question is adumbrated by Habermasa 
The modern sciences produce ••• knowledge whose 
form (and not subjective intention) is that of 
technically applicable knowledge, although74he application usually comes only much later. 
Working in a different tradition. Habermas fills out 
the scheme implied in the above formulation in his essay 
"Erkenntnis und Interesse"a 
' 
Three categories of investigation-processes 
allow the ascertainment of specific connections 
of logico-methodological rules and knowledge-
consti tuti ve interests ••• In the formulation 
of the empirical-analytic7s5ciences a technical interest is incorporated. 
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It would be hopeless, and, felicitously, unnecessary to ex-
plicate the whole of Habermas's position in this paper. 
Nevertheless, since his discussion of science is the only 
one current which manifests explicit awareness of the poli-
tical economy of knowledge, a few key passages may usefully 
be inserted, for they throw Feyerabend's arguments into 
sharp relief a 
In the empirical-analytic sciences,. the 
system of reference, which prejudges the 
meaning of possible statements, specifies 
rules for both the construction and the 
testing of theories. Theories are hypothetic-
deductive systems of statements, which allow 
the derivation of empirically meaningful law-
hypotheses. These are interpreted as statements 
of covariance between observable events, and 
allow predictions according to postulated 
initial conditions. Empirical-analytic knowledge 
therefore is possible predictive knowlenge. The 
meaning of such predictions, i.e., their 
technical applicability, only results from the 
rules according to which we apply the theory 
to reality ••• We can say that facts and the 
relations between them can be grasped "descrip-
tively", but this mode of speech must not be 
allowed to conceal the fact that the relevant 
scientific facts constitute themselves only 
through a preceding organization of our 
experience in the functional system of instru-
mental action ••• empirical scientific theories 
disclose reality under the guiding interest 
of possible consolidation and ~~pansion of 
information-controlled action.r0 
Habermas himself pointed to the differences between 
Popper and himself, exhibiting a proper -- and wholly justi-
I 
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f ied -- confidence that where his theory diverged from 
Critical Rationalism, it did so in the direction of greater 
verisimlitude to the actual conduct of scientific researchJ 
he could account for the puzzles. But the potential cri-
tical dimension in Popperianism eluded him. Feyerabend 
found it, hidden in the emphasis on falsification. Falsi-
fication is !121 ~ technically oriented activity at all, not 
by itself. Discovering what a thing is not affords no auto-
matic amplification of existing manipulative skills, although 
it is trivially true that any positive assertion can be 
expressed as a double negation. This is why the National 
Science Foundation finances only historical research on the 
Pre-Socratics, and it is the gravamen of Feyerabend•s charge 
to Kuhn. Expressed in Habermas's termiuGlogy, Feyerabend 
is proposing a reversal of the "knowledge-constl,tutive 
interest .. characteristic of science since the Renaissance. 
Only on this ·1evel does the argument finally cohere. 
It is thus the intent of Feyerabend's argument to 
~eprive puzzles of their function. Without the puzzles, 
however, industrialized science grinds to a halt. From the 
viewpoint of industrialized science, this might be considered 
malefic. Such is the charge brought against Feyerabend. 
In a brief note published a few years ago, Feyerabend 
suggested that two paradoxes of induction, the celebrated 
Paradox of the Ravens, and the equally notorious Goodman 
conundrum, the so-called "new Riddle of Induction," could be 
JJ 
evaded by considering only negative, i.e., falsifying, in-
stances to count in theory evaluation. Since these problems 
originate in justificational (i.e., problems of positive 
evidence) perplexities, they would both be emulsified in the 
scientia negativa. Subsequently he has suggested, not al-
together implausibly, that excessive interest in such ques-
tions is pathological.77 He concluded by imploring philoso-
phers of science 
to terminate the discussion of such red herrings 
as these and to concentrate upon the more re-
warding task of advancing knowledge by the 
criticism of Qld hypotheses and the suggestion 
of new ones. 7~ · 
T. W. Settle, in a finely written reply. objected that 
Feyerabend is right in his discussion of 
scientific method, but not in his discussion 
of induction. Contrary to most WI·iters in the 
philosophy of science I do not think that 
knowledge grows by induction. .But contrary 
to the usual opponents of inductivism I do not 
think induction can be dismissed, simply 
because it lacks this role in science.7~ 
Settle is here walling off science from the rest of human 
experience. He postulates that the procedures involved in 
science are of a radically different kind from any other 
variety of human knowledge. These other fields grow posi-
' tively, by some sort of mysterious inductive process which 
eludes the Popperian reduction of induction to hopeful 
conjecture, which is then taken as a basis for action on 
a wing and a prayer. 80 But why does he want 
a 
The answer is no surprise, when one reflect 
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tical economy of knowledge. Settle sharply distinguishes 
the quasi-philosophical "science" from technology, pro-
testing that 
••• the role which confirmation plays in 
technology is ignored by Feyerabend ••• 81 
J4 
and then boils down his objection to the charge that accep-
tance of Feyerabend's proposal would be bad for business1 
conf i:rmation is indispensible in such more 
or less intellectual human pursuits as tech-
nology, banking, child-rearing, jurisprudence, 
insurance, politics, and industry.~2 
Shoddy science, entrepreneurial science, reckless science, 
and dirty science could ask for nothing more, right down to 
the invocation of Mother ("child rearing")~ The critical 
dimension drops from sight, and Hegel's Weltgeist strides 
across the pages of the British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science -- "der Gang Gottes in der Welt" -- as Settle 
proposes to make institutional practices (e.g., entrepre-
neurial science) self-justifyinga 
Solutions to the problems of induction are 
likely to be provided by institutional, even 
legal, standards of what is to be §Qunted 
as sufficient positive evidence ••• J 
-V. The Withering Away of Natural Science. 
So the battle lines are drawn. Industrialized sci-
ence -- the "alienation of reason" 84 -- or "revival of 
astrology, witchcraft, magic, alchemy, elaboration of 
Leibniz's Monadology, and so on." 85 What can be said about 
the probable outcome? 
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In the short run, the implications are clear. The 
admixture of a little vulgar Marxism is wonderfully condu-
cive to reliable vaticination. What the Gesellschaft wants, 
the Gesellschaft will get. The New Industrial State is not 
imaginable, save with its characteristic middle adjective. 
But Ravetz cautions that although it "might seem far-fetched 
and alarmist to claim that science is in danger of decline 
and dissolution, through its inability to make a healthy 
response to its new conditions," still, "the history of 
natural science in Europe shows that its steady growth over 
the past centuries has been an aggregate of cycles of growth 
and decline in different fields and plaees ••• it would be 
astonishing if it were not so, for then natural science 
would be the only sort of creative work exempt from such 
rhythm, 1186 and the more remote future poses some interesting 
questions. 
Here ·the answer, I think, must be very much more 
tentative. Ravetz hints in worried tones of a decline in 
."morale", 87 manifested in "certain recognizable symptoms 
rather than hard cases."88 Then there is the obdurate "dis-
appointment in the recruitment to science, measured by the 
number of students electing to study science at university 
and also continuing into research," 89 as well as a "decline 
in the quality of science teaching in the schools."90 These 
are portents of some gravity, and not unexpected. It stands 
to reason that the mantle of explorer of nature was more 
-.····.·.· , 
appealing than a grey flannel suit. Far more significant 
than any of these, however, may be the long run change in 
the intellectual climate. 
J6 
The Zeitgeist is restless. One can observe in the 
developed countries 
any reference to 
the only kind this discussion has 
an exfoliant feeling of disillusionment 
with science and its attendant rationality, a disquieting 
. 
intuition that the blossoming of science and technology was 
really the sprouting of Les Fleurs du Ma1. In this move-
ment, PaulFeyerabend's off-handed remark that 
••• we may construct a world in which it 
[science1 plays no role whatever (such a 
world, rventure to suggest, wou1d be more 
pleasant than the world we live in today).91 
will bulk ever larger. Ravetz hopes for a "critical science" 
with "the relation of the scientist to the external world" 
being "fundamentally different."92 Perhaps a short term 
movement into an environmentally conscious Eco-biology might 
come to resemble such a science. I suspect, howe_ver, that 
this is too sanguines that the withering away of natural 
science may already have begun. 
• 
I 
' f 
I 
l 
I 
FOOTNOTES 
1Liberalism is a pie which many philosophers enjoy 
cutting up; no single definition of the term is likely to 
conform to all the popular usages. For this paper "Liber-
alism" may be understood as the polite equivalent of the 
rather more unfashionable expression "bourgeois thought," 
that is, the thought forms the predominance of which 
attended and results from the rise of the modern industrial 
state. For more extended discussions and invaluable theo-
retical background cf. Karl Marx, "Vorwort," in his Zur 
Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie (Berlins Duncker, 1839), 
and Karl Mannheim, Ideolo~r and Utopia (New Yorks Har-
court, Brace & World, 193 , especially pp. 122-23. My 
interest in stipulating this definition is only to satisfy 
the following adequacy conditions for a more theoretical 
definitions 1) That Liberalism be considered historically, 
with no one particular epistemological or political view 
held to be the essence of Liberalism; 2) That the reformist 
posture of Liberalism be clearly recognized; J) Most of all, 
that no one be unduly exercised when it is discovered that 
not every "Liberal" thinker subscribed to all the tenets 
which might be included in a Liberal catechism; figures 
such as Bacon present especially trucing cases here. 
Of course, it is taken for granted that Keynesian-
ism and Liberalism are now virtually co-terminus, and 
accordingly no argument is offered for the implied sugges-
tion that Galbraith and Price are paradigmatic Liberals of 
the present day. 
2Karl Popper, "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften," 
in Th. W. Adorno, ed., Der Positivismusstreit in der 
deutschen Soziologie (Frankfurta Luchterhand, 1971), p. 114. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all the translations from the 
qerman in this paper were done by me. 
JT. s. Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics," in 
Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge (Cambridgea Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
'p. 263. 
4For a sketch of the differences, whose import may 
be variously assessed, cf. Alan Musgrave, "Kuhn's Second 
Thoughts," in the British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, XXII, No. 3 (1971), PP• 287-97. 
Soon K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Oxford Paper-
backs Oxfords Oxford University Press, 1968). 
6John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 
(2nd edition, reviseds Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 1971). 
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Power." 
7Price, Scientific Estate, p. 19. 
8Galbraith, Industrial State, p. 284n. 
9cf. his Chapter 5, "The Spactrum from Truth to 
10Price, Scientific Estate, p. 111. 
38 
11John Kenneth Galbraith, "Economics as a System of 
Belief," in his Economics, Peace, and Laughter (New Yorka 
New American Library, 1972), PP• 57-58. 
12Ibidl', P• 59. 
!JThe Popper corpus is scattered through forty years 
of books and journals, in several languages. I use in par-
ticular "Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften," in Positivis-
musstreit, pp. 103-231 this is Popper's own summary of his 
position. For comments on the paper cf. David Frisby's 
"The Popper-Adorno Controversy& The Methodological Dis-
pute in German Sociology," in Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, II, No. 2 (1972), pp. 105-19. 
I have aimed for the minimal degree of complication 
commensurate with precision of argument, consequently this 
paper does not consider recent developitents by Imre Lakatos 
of what is essentially a Popperian position. Cf. inter alia, 
his "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes," in Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-195. Neither 
does this paper attempt a detailed criticism of Feyerabend's 
methodological anarchism. However, it is worth noting that 
the residual Liberalism which his recen~ papers exude is 
not nearly as far removed from Popperianism as Feyerabend 
seems to think. In this connection Nore'tta Koertge's "For 
and Against Method," British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, XXIII, No. 3 (1972), pp. 274-89. missed the most 
important point, although it is heartening to observe the 
abandonment by the British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science of its fond fantasy that it could masquerade as a journal of the philosophy of science, without simultaneously 
being a journal of politics, of anthropology, of economics, 
·and of sociology. 
14Kuhn has several times reformulated his position. 
Some have sensed tergiversation, e.g., s. E. Toulmin, "Does 
the Distinction between Normal and Revo1utionary Science 
Hold Water?", in Growth of Knowledge, pp. 39-47. I use the 
revised edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(2nd revised edition; Chicagoa University of Chicago Press, 
1970), with special attention to the "Postscript -- 1969°. 
15on the probable indistinguishability of the two, 
39 
cf. H. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science (revised edition1 
Chicagoa · Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 110-141 his book is a 
pioneering study of the State and science, lamentably gen-
erally unknown among philosophers. A secondary aim of this 
paper is to make a start toward bringing together the liter-
ature in economics and th& social sciences on science, and 
confronting it with the central tradition in philosophy of 
science, so that the criticism (and not "methodology") of 
science can be carried through as a critique of political 
economy in a very elongated sense. 
16cr. Jtlrgen Habermas, "Technik und Wissenschaft als 
Ideologie," in Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie 
(Frankfurta ~urkamp, 1968), pp. 72-7J. 
17cf. Galbraith's Industrial State, but see also 
Ralph Miliband's "Professor Galbraith and American Capital-
ism," in Economics, ed., David Mermelstein (New York a Ran-
dom House, 1970), pp. 531-42. 
18Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New 
Yorka Monthly Review Press, 1966). 
l9Robert Eisner, Review of New Industrial State, in 
uarterl Review of Economics and Business, VII, No. 3(1967), 
p. J. Here I employ the traditional language of "factors" 
of production without prejudice to the issue of its long 
run utility for economic analysis1 cf. Ernest Mandel, The 
Formation of the Economic Thou ht of Karl Marx (New York& 
Monthly Review Press, 1971 , pp. 92-93, for a vigorous argu-
ment. 
20The most illuminating work on this subject, but 
recently published, is Jerome Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge 
and its Social Problems (Oxfords Clarendon Press, 1971), 
whose analysis provides a detailed background for that 
undertaken here. 
21cr. supra, Notes J, S and 6. 
22For the term, and a sketch of the nascent theory, 
·cf. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (Quadrangle 
edition; Chicagoa Quadrangle, 1967), The theory varies 
distinctly in its emphasis on some topics from the treat-
ments referred to in Notes 5 and 6, and is rather similar 
to that of Habermas, cf. supra, Note 4. 
23Ravetz, Knowledge and Social Problems, p. 44. 
24Ibid., p. 45. • 
25Ibid., p. 48. 
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26Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
27Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
28Ibid,, p. 57. 
29cf. Paul K. Feyerabend, "Classical Empiricism," 
in R. Butts, ed., The Methodolo ical Herita e of Newton 
(Torontoa University of Toronto Press, 1970 , pp. 150-170. 
JOPopper, "Logik," p. 106. Those addicted to logo-
machy may debate whether this translation catches all the 
nuances of " ••• alle Kritik besteht in Widerlegungsversuchen." 
. 
JlL, Pearce Williams, "Normal Science, Scientific 
Revolutions and the History of Science," in Growth of Know-
ledge, p. so. 
32ooargaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," 
in Growth of Knowledge, p. 60. 
J3Kuhn, Structure of Revolutions. p• 146. 
34Ibid. , p, 199. 
3~rich Heller, "Karl Kraus," in his The Disinherited 
Mind (New Yorka World Publishing Company·. 1965), p. 239. 
On Vienna, science and philosophy in twenties, cf. also 
William Johnston, The Austrian Mind (Berkeleya University 
of California Press, 1972), especially Chapter 13 (and p. 
401 for Popper); "Kraus, Loos, and Wi ttger.a.stein," in Letters 
from Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Paul Engeimaan, trans. L. 
Furtmtlller (Oxfords Blackwell, 1967), pp. 122-32. 
36rn what follows on Popper, I make heavy use of his 
own account of the genesis of his theories in "Science 1 
Conjectures and Refutations," in his Con.ie<ctures and Refu-
tations (Harper edition1 New Yorka Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 
33-65. 
37Ibid., p. 39· Given this crystal:-clear formulation 
of his view8; and the equally limpid reiteration of them in 
"The Demarcation Between Science and Meta.~usics," in Con-jectures and Refutations, p. 257 and p. 267, one is hard 
pressed to understand John Losee's apparent avowal that 
Popper concerned himself with the tension ·~etween scientific 
method and illicit "conventionalism", to tile exclusion of 
concern with statements themselves. Actua21..ly, he was con-
cerned with both. Cf. Losee's A Histor.icail Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Science (Oxfords Oxford University Press, 
1972), p. 190. This is not to affirm that Popper was inter-
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ested in meaning; he was not. 
Partly because he does not formulate his theories of 
science in the consuetudinary linguistic manner, Polany, 
who is interested in the kinds of commitments scientists 
make, is regularly traduced by his opponents, who don't 
u..riderstand him. Cf., for instance, Lakatos, "Methodology," 
in Growth of Knowledge, pp. 92-93· 
38cf. his "The Demarcation Between Science and Meta-
physics," in Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 253-292. 
J9Popper, "Science," P• 39· 
40Masterman, "Paradigm," P• 72. 
41Popp~r, The O en Societ and Its Enemies, Vol. Ia 
The Spell.of Plato 4th revised editions New Yorks Harper 
& Row, 1963), p. 295. The quotation continues as followsa 
"But the influence of commercial initiative seems to me 
rather important." The key word here is "initiative"; com-
merce is conceived as wholly external to the real product 
of science; Ravetz, of course, does nicely as a refutation 
of this view. Popper's attitude is manifested in his "In 
my opinion, the 'economic conditions' or the 'social rela-
tions' of science are themes which can easily be overdone, 
and which are likely to degenerate into platitude;" Open 
Society, Vol. Ila The Hlp;h Tide of Prophecys Hegel, Marx, 
and the Aftermath, p. 107. Of course, if the link with epis-
temology is broken, platitudes are the likely result. 
42Popper, "The Nature of Philosophical Problems and 
Their Roots in Science," in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 
72. 
43The Poverty of Historicism (Jrd editions New Yorka 
Harper & Row, 1961)1 for the Open Society cf. supra, n. 19. 
44Karl Popper, "The History of Our Timea An Opti-
mist's View," in Conjectures and Refutations, p. J65. 
45Ibid., P• J69. 
46~. 
47Ibid., P• 376. 
48Ibid., P• 375. 
49cf. Popper's contribution to Revolution Oder Re-
forms Herbert Marcuse und Karl Po er -- Eine Konfron-
tation, ed. Franz Stark Jrd editions Muni.cha KBsel-
Verlag, 1972)r his letter to Claus Grossner on Adorno, 
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Habermas, and "revolutionary students," in Claus Grossner, 
Verfall der Philoso}hie (Reinbeck bei Hamburg1 Christian 
Wegner Verlag, 1971 , pp. 278-89, and Grossner's essay, pp. 
136-501 Albert's "Kleines verwundertes Nachwort zu einer 
grossen Einleitung," in Positivismusstreit, p. 3391 and 
Imre Lakatos, "Methodology," in Growth of Knowledge, p. 93• 
"Thus Kuhn's position would vindicate, no doubt, uninten-
tionally, the basic political credo of contemporary reli-
gious maniacs ('student revolutionaries')." Lakatos, whose 
own commitment to Popperianism might be not unfairly de-
scribed as "devout", is here using the term "religious" 
simply as a club to intimidate his opponents. 
50The formulas "Revolution in the intellect, evo-
lution in politics," comes from the Popper letter to 
Grossner, cf. supra, n. J7; "piecemeal" social engineering 
is a favorite Popperian slogan. 
51Kuhn, "Reflections On My Critics," in Growth of 
Knowledge, p. 238. 
52cr. Barry Castro, "The Scientific Opportunities 
Foregone Because of More Readily Available Federal Support 
for Research in Experimental than Theoretical Physics," 
in The Journal Rf.PoliticaJ_l;conomy, LXXVI, No. 4, Part I 
(July/August, 19b8), pp. 601-14; also Kenneth Boulding, 
"The Scientific-Military-Industrial Complex," in The Vir-
ginia Quarterly Review, XLIII, No. 4 (1967), pp. 676-771 
"The scientific estate, alas, swills as enthusiastically at 
the trough of the contract state as their more worldly 
brethern in the profit-making, and alas, even in the non-
profit-making, institutions." To those not professionally 
in the philosophy of science, this conclusion will of 
course partake of a certain obviousness. 
53Kuhn, "Reflections," in Growth of Knowledge, p. 264. 
54Ibid. 
55Popper, "Logik," p. 115. 
56Paul K. Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism, Part 
II," in R. G. Colodny, ed., The Nature and Function of 
Scientific Theories (Pittsburgha University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1970), pp~ 275-353· 
57Feyerabend, "Consolations for 'the Specialist," in 
Growth of Knowledge, P• 198. 
SSibid., p. 201. • 
59Ibid., p. 209, 
l 
60
rbid., p. 212. 
61 Ibid., p. 213. 
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62Feyerabend, "Against Method," in Radner and Wino-
kur, ed., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
Vol. IV1 bnalyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and 
Psycholog;Y, (Minneapolisa University of Minnesota Press, 
1970), p. 20. This may well have been dismissed as hyper-
bole i:l many Q'\arters. It is not; the condition seriously 
affects produf~vity in resea~ch.labor::-tories, cf. D. Davies, 
"A Scarce Res<b..ece Called Curiosity," in D. Lamberton, ed., 
Eco.r,.o!ni>s of Information and Knowledge (Middlesex, Englanda 
Penguin Books, 197ri·, pp. 315-22. It was to be expected that 
as scientif~~;.~education expanded, curiosity would become a 
scarce reso~~'t.S and thus its price would rise. Alas, cur-
iosity as a hflman trait which cannot be bought, and here may 
be an irresolvable contradiction in capitalism. This argu-
ment should be considered in the light of the last section 
of this paper. 
63Feyerabend, "Against Method," p. 72. 
64Ibid., P• 20. 
65Ibid., P• 101, n27B. 
66Feyerabend, "Consolations," p. 212. 
67Feyerabend, "Against Method," p. 106, n41. 
68Ibid., P• 90. 
69Ibid., P• 91. 
70Kuhn, "Reflections, " p. 242. 
7libid., P• 247. 
72Ibid., p. 245. 
7JFeyerabend, "Consolations," p. 208, n2. 
74Habermas, "Technik und Wissenschaft," pp. 72-73: I 
have translated from the German this passage and those which 
follow. 
75Habermas, "Erkenntnis und Interesse," in his book 
Technik und Wissenschaft, p. 155; the other two "investiga-
tion-processes" are irrelevant in this context. 
76rbid., pp. 156-57. That knowledge-constitutive 
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interests can in fact, if not necessarily in Habermas, be 
affected by conscious human choice must be pressed with some 
urgency. (This is not thereby to imply that one can pri-
vately reconstitute the world anew just before climbing out 
of bed in the morning.) Habermas, in his more tenebrous 
formulations, seems sometimes to treat "interest" as if "es 
sich nicht um wirkliche, nicht einmal um politische Inter-
essen, sondern um reine Gedanken handelt •.• ," (Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, Werke [!¥th editions 
Berlins Dietz, 1969], III, p. 39); Feyerabend, with his pro-
fusion of concrete proposals, is clear that he intends no 
such stale (and Quietistic) Kantianism; one can only regret 
the obstacles which Habermas' relentlessly opaque style 
creates to the enlistment of critical assent. 
In "The Dialectical Foundations of Critical Theorya 
Jttrgen Habermas' Metatheoretical Investigations," Telos, 
No. 12 (Summer, 1972), pp. 93-114, Trent Shroyer employs a 
notion, alleged to be derived from Habermas, of an "invar-
iant" (technical, etc.) interest; a view to which this 
essay is diametrically opposed. Constraints of time and 
space impel me to prescind from all the excellent points 
made in his paper, and merely to suggest a few of the rea-
sons that undergird my conviction that the notion of "in-
variance" is false both to theory and to practice. 
First, Shroyer's view that "the Im.sic orientation of 
man to nature re1nains an ever-transformi.Qg, yet logical:iy 
invariant, relation of instrumental actl*1" (p. 101), is 
historically inadequate. It is simply not true that all 
ages and cultures have confronted nature with an eye toward 
extensive and expeditious plunder (the •technical interest"). 
Not even all "science", but only the Western, post-Renais-
sance version of it approaches nature from such a warped and 
truncated perspective. Even the very suggestion of an "ever-
transforming ••• relation of instrumental action" would have 
appeared preposterous to nearly every major school of 
thought prior to Vico. 
Secondly, statements such as "Valid beliefs are uni-
versal propositions ••• " (p. 101) only pump more hot air into 
a scientistic balloon, and thereby camouf.lage the chaotic 
reality of the actual problem-situation in the sciences, 
where, as Feyerabend has put it, "not a single theory ever 
· agrees with all the known facts in its domain" (''Against 
Method," p. J6). In this instance one sees clearly how the 
so-called "Critical Theory" now depends for its plausibil-
ity on a regressive image of science, and how that theory 
helps to conceal the political foundations of contemporary 
scientific self-understanding, thereby supporting the pre-
tensions of the Positivism it claims to unmask. 
??Paul K. Feyerabend, "Philosophy of Sciences A 
Subject With A Great Past," in Roger Stuewer, ed., Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vo.l. Va Historical 
I 
and Philoso hical Pers ectives of Science (Minneapolisa 
University of Minnesota Press, 1970 , pp. 172-8J. 
78Paul K. Feyerabend, "A Note on Two 'Problems• of 
Induction," in the British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, XIX, No. J (1968), p. 253. 
79T. w. Settle, "The Point of Positive Evidence --
Reply to Professor Feyerabend," British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, XX, No. 4 (1969), P• 353· 
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8
°For Popper's position, cf. especially "Sciences 
Conjectures and Refutations," in Conjectures and Refutations, 
pp. JJ-65. Here Popper manifests his awareness that the 
entire Popperian theory of science depends on the existence 
of a continuum between the acquisition of scientific know-
ledge and that obtained through common-sense; that as he 
elsewhere puts ita " •.• scientific knowledge can be more 
easily studied than common-sense knowledge. For it is 
common-sense knowledge writ large, as it were:--rts very 
problems are enlargements of the problems of common-sense 
knowledge." ("Preface -- 1959," in The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery (Londona Hutchinson, 1959), p. 22.) His position 
is that inductions simply don't exist• that they are but 
conjectures, for all the shouting and knitting of brows 
which might accompany them. Settle wo\11.d have to explain 
why some conjectures, and only those, qualify for the 
honorific status of inductions. 
81settle, "Reply," p. 353· 
82Ibid., P• 354. 
SJibid., P• 355. 
84The phrase originates with Leszek Kolakowski. 
85Feyerabend, "Against Method," p. 106, n41. 
86Ravetz, Knowledge and Social Problems, p. 67. 
S7Ibid., P• 58. 
88Ibid. 
S9Ibid. 
90ibid., P• 59. 
91Feyerabend, "Consolations," p. 228. 
92Kavetz, Knowledge and Social Problems, p. 4JO. The 
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unreflective incorporation of a technical interest into 
social science research projects accounts partially for the 
oft-remarked ease with which their results are converted 
into instruments of further manipulation. The consequences 
for social science of a withering away of its paragon are 
difficult to imagine, but should not be underestimated in 
their magnitude. The price of "rigor" in a discipline such 
as political science has been mortis. Devaluing natural 
science would make it more likely that problem selection 
would be governed by the character of reality, than -- as at 
present -- by the state of existing theory • 
r 
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